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SEARCHING FOR THE PEACEABLE 
KINGDOM 
EMBLEMS OF PLURAliSM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
AND THE STATE. By Carol Weisbrod.1 Princeton University 
Press. 2002. Pp. ix, 222. $45.00. 
Mark D. Rosen2 
The Amish community disciplines its members through the 
meidung (shunning), under which community members are re-
quired to avoid business and social contact with the ostracized 
individual unless and until she is restored to the church fellow-
ship (p. 65). If the shunned person brings a lawsuit for alienation 
of affections, defamation, or tortious interference with contract, 
what if anything should the court do (pp. 65-68)? 
Polygamy was integral to early Mormon religious life. The 
United States prosecuted Brigham Young's secretary, George 
Reynolds, for violating an Act of Congress that banned polyg-
amy in federal territories.3 The Supreme Court famously upheld 
the conviction against Reynolds's claim that the First Amend-
ment's free exercise clause guaranteed him the right to practice 
his religion in accordance with his church's beliefs.4 Was this ap-
propriate? 
In Emblems of Pluralism: Cultural Differences and the State, 
Carol Weisbrod suggests that such questions are best ap-
proached structurally by taking account of the relationships 
among three entities: the individual, the group, and government. 
Weisbrod invokes visual metaphors to describe two possible re-
lationships: verticality, which suggests hierarchy (p. 13), and 
horizontalness, which she associates with coequality and "plural-
I. Ellen Ash Peters Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. 
2. Associate Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology. Thanks to Brian Bix, Sarah H. Harding, and Dina Warner for comments. All er-
rors are mine. 
3. See United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 146 (1878). 
4. !d. at 161-67. 
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ism" (p. 97). Her main thesis is that there is no single or a priori 
relationship among the three (pp. 204-05). For example, the state 
could be viewed as just one group among many that provides 
rules and sanctions to guide people (a horizontal relationship be-
tween groups and the state) or, alternatively, the state could be 
the entity that authoritatively determines the powers enjoyed by 
all other groups. There is no fixed relationship, Weisbrod sug-
gests, because, among other reasons, none of these three entities 
has a fixed character that is independent of the other two (p. 3). 
For instance, "[w]e can perhaps say both" that "individuals cre-
ate groups and groups create individuals" (p. 202). Similarly, 
sovereignty can be said to inhere in the state, groups, or indi-
viduals (pp. 30-31). 
Weisbrod's stated concern is not to describe the doctrinal 
status quo, or to argue for a change. Instead, the book more 
modestly intends to show the "complexities of the problems" (p. 
202) and to "illuminate certain interactions to the end of compli-
cating a political conversation of pluralism" (p. 209).5 Consistent 
with these stated aims, the book studiously avoids taking posi-
tions.6 Methodologically, it collects many interesting historical 
examples, legal cases, theoreticians, as well as literary and art 
works, which it then uses to illustrate competing approaches that 
can be taken to the relations among individuals, groups, and the 
state.7 
Open-endedness is the book's sine qua non, and Weisbrod is 
mercilessly noncommital even with respect to herself. Consider, 
for instance, the aforementioned visual metaphors that Weis-
brod uses to both title and structure the book. Emblems is di-
vided into two parts, one which is represented by the "emblem" 
of Erastus Field's painting Historical Monument of the American 
Republic, the "hierarchical understanding of American federal-
ism" (p. 13), and the second which is represented by Edward 
Hicks's painting The Peaceable Kingdom, which represents for 
Weisbrod a "horizontal, pluralist" vision of federalism (p. 97).8 
5. "The book has not attempted to propose a solution to the questions it has 
raised. The attempt rather has been to join the conversation on pluralism by reviewing 
the complexities of the problems" (p. 202). 
6. One of the few exceptions is discussed later in this essay. 
7. Even the theorists are utilized to illustrate potential approaches rather than to 
build an argument that could bring about closure. See, e.g., pp. 30-43, discussed infra. 
8. It might be difficult for some readers to appreciate in what respect Hicks's 
painting can be used to represent pluralism because, in a startling editorial oversight, the 
edition of the book I reviewed did not include a reproduction of the Peaceable Kmgdom. 
(Field's painting appears on the cover.) This fact, along with th'! conclusion stated in this 
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Emblems also dedicates five pages to discussing the two paint-
ings and the ideas they conjure (pp. 13-15, 97-98). Notwithstand-
ing these metaphors' centrality, Weisbrod states that "[i]t is pos-
sible that the division of the book into part 1 and part 2 suggests 
a false dichotomy" (p. 100). Similarly, the concluding chapter 
submits that "[i]t is possible that the visual images used in this 
book, the emblems, are inadequate for the future we want, in 
part because they are too static" and that "[m]usical metaphors 
may go deeper" (p. 208). Acknowledging that the emblems that 
provide the book's title and structure are possibly so misleading 
and inadequate9 well represents the book's uncompromising 
commitment to open-endedness. 
Although Emblems does "not attempt[] to propose a solu-
tion to the questions it has raised" (p. 202), Weisbrod clearly has 
strong views on many of them. Most importantly, she is an en-
thusiastic proponent of pluralism, and writes as if the reader is 
also. 10 The book's final paragraph advances an epistemological 
claim that could validate the absence of a justification for plural-
ism: "The feeling for pluralism reduces itself more to a stance, or 
a mind-set, than it does to an agenda or an answer. It becomes a 
preoccupation more than a thesis, relating to horizontal rather 
than vertical relations" (p. 209). This is an intriguing idea, but 
surely more is needed than such ipse dixit to answer the sus-
tained philosophical justifications for pluralism that have been 
formulated by such contemporary thinkers as Charles Taylor, 
Will Kymlicka, and Jeremy Waldron.ll 
review's final paragraph account for the review's title. 
9. There might be other problems with the book's chosen organizational scheme. 
See infra note 13. 
10. For instance, "[i]t would also seem impossible to be committed to pluralist 
group life without seriously examining historical pluralist thought" (p. 114); "we speak 
sometimes of wanting a pluralism that will tolerate some who are themselves not tolerant 
of plural approaches" (p. 208); assuming that "if we are political liberals" that "we" 
would have a "commitment to the ideals of group autonomy and flourishing diversity in a 
pluralist order" (p. 91). 
I I. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: 
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25-74 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994); WILL 
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY 
RIGHTS 94 (1995). For a sharp critique of Taylor's and Kymlicka's approaches, see 
BRIAN M. BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF 
MULTICULTURALISM (2001). For a response, see Jeremy Waldron, One Law for All? 
The Logic of Cultural Accommodation, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2002). For an effort 
at grounding pluralism in Rawlsian political theory, see Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Lim-
its of Community Self-Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian 
Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1998) [hereinafter Outer Limits]. For a 
sharp critique of my approach, see Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand The Importance of 
Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 1010-1017 (2002). For a re-
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For this reason alone Weisbrod's book could not be the last 
word on the subject. Fortuitously, this in no way undermines 
Emblems' ambition of only "join[ing]" and "complicating" the 
"conversation on pluralism" (pp. 202, 209). Such an argument is 
not readily summarized (though I tried to do so in the first pages 
of this review). In any event, the strength of the book lies in the 
very interesting and wide-ranging materials that it assembles. 
The first part of this review accordingly examines some of these 
enlightening materials so as to give the reader a sense of what 
the book offers. While Emblems readily succeeds in its declared 
aim of complicating the reader's understanding of pluralism, the 
seemingly unending progression of potential perspectives the 
book offers can be dizzying. To this reader, Emblems in this way 
underscores the need for some guiding theory to help resolve the 
very real questions regarding group autonomy that arise with 
some frequency in the United States. 12 Though Emblems does 
not purport to provide a theoretical framework for resolving the 
dilemmas that are raised by claims for group autonomy, the sec-
ond part of this review builds on materials discussed in the book 
that hold out promise for developing an analytical framework 
for analyzing pluralism and group autonomy. 
I 
As mentioned above, Emblems' ten chapters are divided in 
two parts, "Monumental Federalism" (representing verticality) 
and "The Peaceable Kingdom" (representing horizontality). The 
first chapter tells the curious story of Robert Owen's trip to the 
United States in 1824-25. Today, Owen typically is remembered 
as a utopian thinker who established the small experimental 
community of New Harmony with the expectation that it would 
be the model that would be universally adopted in the future. 
His vision was that small communities were to be the basic unit 
of society, with each community voluntarily linking with others 
to create a decentralized federation. New Harmony died out af-
ter a few years, and today the appellation "utopian" that is at-
tached to Owen ordinarily brings to mind images of naivety and 
failed social experiments. 
sponse, see Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American 
Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 967-68 & n. 455 (2002). 
12. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205 (1972); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpu-
ram, 598 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Or. 1984). 
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Weisbrod reminds the reader that Owen met with virtually 
all the top American officials when he first came to this country: 
he spoke to both Houses of Congress, addressed the Supreme 
Court, and personally met with Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and 
John Quincy Adams (pp. 19, 23). Weisbrod then asks why some-
one like Owen received the audience he did. Her two related an-
swers are illuminating. First, she suggests that there was less dis-
tance between the United States and Owen than it appears in 
our current historical moment; Owen was more mainstream, and 
the United States was more self-consciously experimental, than 
people today typically think (pp. 19-28). Second, there was im-
portant substantive overlap in their interests; both were inter-
ested in small political units that were linked through a federa-
tion (pp. 19-28). 
Emblems' first chapter is an absorbing way to unsettle con-
temporary sensibilities some might have that a "monumental 
federalism" of a rigidly vertical hierarchy with the federal gov-
ernment at the apex is American federalism's intrinsic and nec-
essary form. Such an image of American federalism may be a 
straw man, however, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's 
new federalism jurisprudence of the last decade. More funda-
mentally, one might ask: Of what contemporary relevance is it 
that foundational questions regarding the structure of American 
federalism were unanswered in the 1820s? It seems to me, 
though, that Weisbrod's point facilitates the imagination of al-
ternatives to the status quo. Of course, the possibility of alterna-
tives alone does not indict the status quo; normative analysis of 
the sort that Emblems does not provide is necessary to do that. 
The Owen narrative nonetheless is a useful first step to the ar-
gument for a greater accommodation of pluralism that Emblems 
implicitly champions. 13 
Chapter 2, "Indians and Individualists: A Multiplicity of 
Sovereignties," makes several noteworthy points. First and 
foremost is that a commitment to political decentralization is not 
necessarily a commitment to pluralism. For instance, though 
Owen thought that society was best organized on the basis of 
13. Although it is understandable why Weisbrod would have wanted to start the 
book's project of expanding the reader's perspective with this chapter, it does not readily 
fit into Part One, which purports to address vertical federalism. After all, the chapter fo. 
cuses on the interest in decentralized political power shared by Owen and early Ameri· 
cans. Chapters 2 and 5, summarized below, also do not appear to readily fit the under the 
rubric of "monumental federalism." Such lack of fit only sharpens the above-mentioned 
questions Weisbrod raises about the utility of the two emblems' efficacy as organizing 
pnnc1ples. 
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small communities, he thought that there was one wal that all 
such small political units should be structured (p. 31).1 By con-
trast, Native American aspirations of tribal sovereignty and John 
Calhoun's concept of "concurrent majorities" (more on this 
later)-a somewhat surprising grouping, to say the least-
exemplify the commitment to enduring diversity across groups 
that qualifies as pluralism (pp. 31, 39). 
The bulk of Chapter 2 comprises a discussion of several 
loosely connected ideas concerning sovereignty and groups. One 
is that "sovereignty" can be said to inhere in the state, groups, or 
even individuals (pp. 30-31). In support of the latter, Weisbrod 
quotes Lyssander Spoon's argument that government has no 
right to infringe on the sovereignty of the individual (p. 37). 
Though the chapter does not clearly explain what it means by 
group sovereignty, it surveys in two pages what Weisbrod takes 
to be three normative approaches to group life in the United 
States: the views that (1) the very existence of groups is bad be-
cause the national community is actually an organic whole (p. 
42); (2) groups are a mixed bag because, while factions might in-
vade the right of minorities, a multiplicity of groups might lower 
the risk that a majority can invade the interests of a minority 
(pp. 42-43); and (3) groups "are on the whole valuable and nec-
essary" (p. 43). Consistent with the book's methodology, Weis-
brod presents these varying approaches without attempting to 
assess their strengths and weaknesses. 
Weisbrod concludes the chapter by arguing against the no-
tion "that there was, there must have been, a clear and universal 
sense of the official state as the final arbiter, setter of the limits, 
creator and keeper of boundaries" of the sovereignty of the 
various entities (p. 44). Her argument rests wholly on an 1837 
Mississippi case in which a court held that a slave whom an In-
dian woman had gifted to her daughter pursuant to tribal law 
could not be seized to satisfy the debts of the donor's husband, 
notwithstanding the state's abolition of tribal law a year after the 
gift had been made (p. 44). Weisbrod concludes that this "is not 
a clear story either of the triumph of group interest or of state 
hierarchy" (p. 45). 15 Though even a single case proves the postu-
14. Weisbrod suggests that anarchist thinkers such as Lysander Spooner held a 
similarly monist conception that proper reasoning leads to a singular set of laws that 
should govern society (pp. 35-39). 
15. Weisbrod is unquestionably correct that the case is amenable to contradictory 
interpretations. On the one hand, the state court deferred to tribal law. On the other 
hand, the Mississippi case could be understood as a paradigm of state hierarchy insofar as 
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late that there was not a "universal" understanding that the state 
was supreme (p. 44), how important would it be if the thesis 
were vindicated by only one obscure judicial opinion? Because 
the proposition Weisbrod advances here is likely to be counter-
intuitive to many, the force of her argument would seem to be 
dependent on other such evidence, which the book unfortu-
nately does not provide. 
Chapter 3 "explores the idea that groups are a threat" to the 
state (p. 8). Focusin~ on the relationship between religious 
groups and the state, 6 it makes many important points. It as-
tutely observes that "religions tend to function in ways that are 
quite statelike" insofar as they prescribe conduct and issue sanc-
tions (pp. 46-47). This seems to be the predicate for Weisbrod's 
larger thesis that there are not "separate boxes" of church and 
state, but "that these boxes are better conceived as interpene-
trating units" (p. 46). Although interpenetration may well char-
acterize American doctrine17 -a point the book illustrates well 
by providing an extensive discussion of Mormon history- the 
reader might wonder whether this invariably is so. After all, it is 
conceivable that a government could provide a religious commu-
nity with a geographical enclave in which it has full autonomy 
over its members, and the book seems to be a meditation on the 
range of possible relationships between government and groups 
generally rather than a U.S.-focused exposition.18 On the other 
hand, to the extent Emblems is understood to discuss pluralism 
in twenty-first century America rather than what is theoretically 
possible, it is undeniably true that "a church attempting today to 
create its own world as to family and education will necessarily 
involve itself in the structuring of the state environment" be-
cause "a religious group cannot control its environment in the 
tribal law applied only because the state determined that state law could not "be con-
strued to extend so far as to interfere with the rights to property previously acquired." 
Fisher v. Allen, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 611, 616 (1837). 
16. Chapter 3 makes the critical observation that religious persons may be subject 
to "two powerful claims to priority," the church and the state (p. 46). Jeremy Waldron 
recently argued that it is this that properly sets religion apart from non-religious com-
mitments (and accordingly justifies broad swaths of religious-based exemptions from civil 
law). See Waldron, supra note 11. If this is so, Emblems' discussion with regard to reli-
gious groups might not generalize to groups that define themselves on bases apart from 
religion. If a particular group is relied upon as being representative of others-the chap-
ter, after all, is supposed to make generic points about groups and the state (p. 8)-it is 
important to forthrightly consider to what extent the chosen group is representative. 
17. I have argued that this is the case. See Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expres-
sivism, and Federalism, 78 CHL-KENT L. REV. 669,674-80 (2003). 
18. For instance, Weisbrod surveys many European theorists (e.g., pp. 101-12) and 
dedicates a full chapter to the League of Nations (pp. 119-37). 
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way that was possible in the nineteenth century" (p. 62). Inter-
penetration thus appears to be an inescapable concomitant of 
the deep and broad regulation that characterizes contemporary 
American government, even if it is not a universal imperative. 
Chapter 3 identifies two dangers that religious groups pose 
to states. First, the groups might seek to "co-opt [the state] to en-
force religious norms universally" (p. 47). Second, even if the 
group tries to "separate [itself] from the state so that [it] can op-
erate (quasi) autonomously" (p. 47), the group's activities within 
its enclave may have spillover effects on general society (pp. 53-
56). The latter is one of the commonly understood justifications 
for the Supreme Court's decision upholding the prohibition 
against bigamy in Reynolds v. United States: 19 bigamy was seen as 
containing the "seed of destruction of a democratic society" (p. 
55).20 Weisbrod insightfully observes that opposition to bigamy 
was part of a more general nineteenth century defense of mar-
riage that included resistance to laws that permitted easy divorce 
and remarriage, what was dubbed "serial polygamy" (p. 53). This 
leads to one of the book's few firm conclusions: "[u]nder the im-
pact of current events in the area of divorce and nonmaritalliv-
ing arrangements, it is relatively simple to say that nineteenth-
century Mormon marriage was not given a fair hearing" (p. 175). 
This is a wisely nuanced position that points out an inconsistency 
without taking sides on the ultimately empirical questions of 
whether polygamy and divorce undermine marriage and whether 
monogamous marriage is a prerequisite to a well-functioning 
democracy. 
Chapter 4 extends the analysis to take account of individu-
als. A group's actions may aggrieve individual members, who 
might solicit assistance from the state. A governmental policy to 
grant groups considerable autonomy accordingly might come at 
the expense of some individuals. For example, polygamy might 
harm co-wives (p. 55), and the Amish meidung imposes emo-
tional and financial costs on the shunned individual (pp. 67-70). 
Weisbrod soberly identifies the pros and cons of state inter-
vention in such situations. On the side of intervention, the indi-
vidual might be said to be imbued with the rights of a larger 
group to which she belongs (the state, for instance) that cannot 
be infringed, the intermediate group might be overstepping its 
bounds, and the interests of the state might require that the indi-
19. 98 u.s. 145 (1878). 
20. Quoting People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,724-25 (1964). 
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vidual be protected (p. 74). In opposition to state intervention, 
the individual might be said to have consented to being regu-
lated by the group, intervention might undermine the intermedi-
ate group, and state intervention frequently will not be effective 
when the complainant desires to remain part of a thick commu-
nity (pp. 74-76). The book does a nice job of illustrating why 
state remedies might be ineffective, though it does not give suffi-
cient attention to the problems of determining whether there has 
been true consent and, relatedly, whether there is a real exit op-
tion?1 Even so, the book's concise summary of the arguments for 
and against intervention in aid of aggrieved individuals is valu-
able. 
Less helpful is the chapter's treatment of the Constitution's 
position on the conflict between groups and individuals. Weis-
brod asks: "[W]hat do we mean by the Constitution? And, what 
understanding of the relations between groups and the state 
does our Constitution assume at any point in time? A position 
on the question of group autonomy would seem to be part of the 
social-political reality that underlies a constitution" (pp. 78-79). 
This is all Weisbrod has to say on the subject. It is intrigu-
ing, but regretfully incomplete.22 Even a brief discussion of some 
of the many constitutional doctrines that mediate the tension be-
tween individuals and groups (such as the First Amendment 
right of association, constitutional limits on peremptory chal-
lenges, equal protection doctrines concerning affirmative action 
and voting rights)23 could have helped the author explain how 
the Court's conception of group autonomy has shifted over time 
and show why she believes such conceptions are pre-
constitutional views that underlie constitutional doctrine?4 
21. For an excellent discussion of the problems of consent, see Seth Kreimer, "But 
Whoever Treasures Freedom . .. " The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 907, 926-928 (1993). On exit, see Barbara H. Fried, "If You Don't Like It, 
Leave It": The Problem of Exit in Social Contractarian Arguments, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
40 (2003). 
22. This passage of the book calls to mind an earlier chapter's unfulfilled promise of 
"involv[ing] a different version of constitutionalism from the one conventionally used. 
Whereas some discussion focuses on the 'words on parchment' definition of constitution-
alism, the present section uses constitutionalism as a framework, a way of being, or a set 
of folkways, rather than emphasizing language or the interpretation of language" (p. 61). 
23. See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expres-
sive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998). 
24. Weisbrod's formulation suggests that at any point in time there is a single un-
derstanding with regard to group autonomy. It might be thought that the constitutional 
doctrines that touch on group autonomy referenced above in the text cast doubt on any 
such coherence. For example, today there is a relatively strong association right, yet con-
stitutional doctrine does not permit lawyers to strike potential jurors on the basis of race 
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Though Emblems is a cross-disciplinary book, such a discussion 
would have been appropriate and welcome in a book written by 
a law professor. 
Chapter 5 "attempts a wide-angle presentation of various 
ways in which group-state encounters can be structured" (p. 81). 
It sketches three basic approaches. Under "corporatism," an in-
dividual's political rights are a function of the social group to 
which she belongs (p. 81). Examples include the millet system of 
the Ottoman empire and the Mennonites in pre-1789 Germany 
(pp. 81-82). Weisbrod notes that although such group-sensitive 
rights can be used to benefit minority groups (for instance, Men-
nonite exemption from military service in Germany due to their 
creed of nonresistance), it frequently has been deployed to harm 
minority groups (for instance, the Jews in czarist Russia) (pp. 81-
85). An alternative is the modern liberal approach of unitary 
citizenship, which focuses on individuals and eliminates group 
privileges (pp. 86-87).25 Weisbrod seems to be attracted to a 
third, hybrid approach that "think[ s] of groups as formed by in-
dividuals-so that individuals retain[] their primary place-while 
still possessing a group identity" (p. 90). Though she is con-
cerned that group membership can lead to "denigration and 
stigmatization," and for that reason she is "conflicted" about 
"the problem of identifying groups, about seeing individuals as 
members of groups, and about raising issues of group character-
istics," Weisbrod simultaneously embraces a "commitment to 
the ideals of group autonomy and flourishing diversity in a plu-
ralist order" (p. 91).26 How these inharmonious concerns and 
or gender on the view that inferences can be made about an individual's likely biases 
based on the race or gender group to which he or she belongs. Compare Boy Scouts of 
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) with J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rei. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146-
51(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, the fact that constitutional doctrine does 
not single-mindedly vindicate or disregard group interests does not necessarily signal an 
incoherent position vis-a-vis groups. Rather, each case may implicate a different array of 
competing constitutional interests, such that group interests of equal moment might pre-
vail in one instance and yield to competing concerns in another. 
25. Weisbrod notes, however, that "group life had its own history, even in liberal 
settings" (p. 87), and describes several respects in which group identity has played a role 
in public life in the United States. For instance, she describes the example of a trial judge 
in New York who in the early twentieth century dismissed all Catholics from a jury in a 
trial where the complainant sought an absolute divorce (pp. 87-88). 
26. At the chapter's close Weisbrod invokes an illuminating metaphor. Against the 
"solution to state-group problems" known as the melting pot, which aims to eliminate 
group differences through assimilation, Weisbrod quotes the metaphor provided by an 
early twentieth century clergyman who spoke of America as a "refining pot" where the 
"dross" of old-world hatreds would be lost but individuals would retain their group iden-
tities (p. 94). 
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principles are to be reconciled is not explained. Thus closes the 
part of the book identified as "monumental federalism." 
Part 2 of the book commences with a chapter that surveys 
theoreticians of pluralism. Weisbrod begins by "set[ting] out as 
background some of the general theoretical material on sover-
eignty" before proceeding to pluralism (p. 101). This is wise be-
cause pluralism's premise of non-state sources of state-like regu-
lation is based on an antecedent understanding of what state 
sovereignty is and is not. The book's discussion of sovereignty is 
very difficult to follow, however, because there is a veritable 
landslide of theorists-most of whom are not likely to be known 
to the book's audience-whose ideas and critiques of fellow 
theorists are not adequately captured in the few sentences that 
Emblems provides.27 
Most of chapter 6's discussion of pluralism is spent on a sur-
prising selection of three theoreticians: the Russian anarchist 
prince Peter Kropotkin; Abraham Kuyper, a leader of the Dutch 
Anti-Revolutionary Party in the early twentieth century; and 
Alexander Pekelis, a Russian-born Jew who studied law at Co-
lumbia and worked in nonprofit agencies for the six years that he 
lived in the United States (p. 106, 115). Why these three? Weis-
brod says that the first two thinkers' political ideas "might have 
been important in fact, to a population that included substantial 
elements that were not English" and suggests that "their ideas 
could easily have been available to Americans thinking about 
political structures" (p. 106). Weisbrod makes no effort to 
document their influence, however, and she acknowledges in a 
footnote that the publications of one of them "are largely avail-
able only in Dutch" and that commentary on it "often is written 
from within the Reformed Church and is published in religiously 
focused journals" (p. 106 & n. 28). The selection of these theore-
27. One representative section of the chapter reads as follows: 
Carl Schmidt offered what has been called a modernized version of Hobbes and 
Bodin that sees the sovereign as the source not of the rule but of the exception. 
It is a version of absolutism .... "Schmidt's jurisprudence puts sovereignty-in 
the exception rather than the norm-at the center. The sovereign as uncom-
manded commander." Carl Schmidt's discussion of pluralism (in The Concept of 
the Political and also in an essay called "Ethic of State and Pluralistic State") 
examines the theories of English pluralism particularly. It finds them inade-
quate because they fail to locate a specific sense of the political. Schmitt's cri-
tique of Laski and Cole accepts many of their descriptions of the social uni-
verse. It finally rejects their vision, however. Schmidt's sentence is that the 
sovereign decides on the exception. Agamben, quoting Schmidt, adds Walter 
Benjamin: The Modern world is one of permanent exception. 
Pp. 101-02 (quoting MICHAEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (Colin Gordon ed., 
1980)). 
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ticians, it would seem, more likely reflects the author's sense that 
their ideas are important and paradigmatic, even if these writers 
themselves are not broadly known. The secondary material 
Weisbrod provides to explain Kuyper's political thought reveals, 
however, that Kuyper's approach is deeply grounded in theol-
ogy.28 One wonders how useful Kuyper is as a representative, 
particularly since Weisbrod states that the approach he describes 
is "strikingly parallel to that presented by other nontheological 
schools of political thought" (p. 107). One of those other (un-
named) thinkers perhaps would have been a more suitable can-
didate. 
Be that as it may, the array of approaches to pluralism that 
Weisbrod provides is, as usual, illuminating. All attribute 
strength and importance to non-state groups in ways that differ 
markedly from the conception held by many Americans that 
such groups are naturally and properly subordinated to the state. 
Kuyper advocates "sphere sovereignty," which posits that social 
groups (such as family, town, church, school) "are prior" to the 
state and are sovereign in their own right (p. 107). The state 
must "uphold and strengthen the sovereignty of the social 
spheres" (p. 107). A single paragraph recites several critiques of 
Kuyper's approach found in secondary literature, including the 
difficulty in defining the appropriate scope of each sphere (pp. 
108-09). 
Weisbrod then turns to Kropotkin's view of society as a 
"multitude of associations" that is "federated for all the pur-
poses which require federation ... by means of free agreements 
between them" (p. 109). Kropotkin writes that "no need of gov-
ernment will be felt, because free agreement and federation take 
its place in all those functions which governments consider as 
theirs at the present time" (p. 110). Somewhat mysteriously, 
Weisbrod writes that although "Kropotkin's ideas, and those of 
anarchism generally, always have been associated with a no-
government position ... , Kropotkin was led quite naturally to 
emphasize not only no government, but also limited govern-
ment" (p. 110). The summary of Kropotkin's thought that Em-
blems provides does not permit the reader to resolve the para-
28. "Society is made up of social groups, related organically, rather than of indi· 
viduals related impersonally. These groups, or spheres, received their sovereignty from 
God, not from the state. They are prior to the state. The state is necessary because of sin, 
and is due to God's gratia universalis" (p. 107, quoting Dirk Jellema, Abraham Kuyper's 
Attack on Liberalism, 19 REV. POL. 472,485 (1957)). 
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dox of his support for both no-government and limited govern-
ment. 
Emblems then considers "English pluralism," whose think-
ers believed that "group life was real, independent of, and often 
competing with, the state" (p. 112). According to the secondary 
materials Weisbrod quotes, pluralists "proposed dissolution of 
the state" or, at least, to "devolve responsibilities, to reinforce 
horizontal relationships, and to dispense with or at least divide 
up vertical ones" (p. 113). Weisbrod then notes several critiques 
that have been made of English pluralism: To what extent is the 
state justified in interfering with groups? What if anything 
should the state do if a group applies economic or social pres-
sures to keep members from leaving it, or if a group "cripples 
the character of [its] members" (p. 114)? These are critical ques-
tions. Without any proposed solutions- and, consistent with the 
book's methodology, none are provided-it may be difficult for 
the reader to see much contemporary value in English pluralism. 
The last pluralist thinker surveyed in chapter 6 is Alexander 
Pekelis. Weisbrod tells us that "Pekelis elaborated his positions 
carefully" and that he "insisted on the right of minority groups 
to self-determination at critical points," though she does not 
specify in what respects (p. 118). Much of the book's discussion 
of Pekelis concerns the serious attention he gave to the power of 
non-state groups. Pekelis dubbed them "private governments" 
and argued that constitutional guarantees should apply to them 
(p. 117). Pekelis interestingly anticipated the development of the 
state action doctrine, under which constitutional limitations are 
applied to certain nongovernmental actors/9 but Emblems' dis-
cussion does not make clear why Pekelis is a sufficient paradigm 
of pluralist thought to merit the attention he is given. 
The last chapters of the book make a set of points that seek 
to complicate the reader's understanding of groups and indi-
viduals. It is argued that while a person's identity is partly a func-
tion of the groups with which she identifies, the groups them-
selves are not constants of nature but instead are social artifacts 
that are subject to change. The mutability of groups is the predi-
cate for Weisbrod's critique of the so-called "minority treaties" 
of the League of Nations, the main subject of chapter 7. The 
treaties aimed to protect ethnic minorities in Turkey, Austria, 
Bulgaria, and Hungary (p. 120). These countries were required 
29. See generally Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 172, 
186-88 (2004). 
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to fund the groups' social, cultural, and educational institutions, 
and to allow the groups to manage such institutions on their own 
(p. 121). Though the treaties at first glance might appear to be 
paragons of pluralism, Weisbrod criticizes them insofar as they 
"defined which particular group affiliations were important-as 
in fact they were-tending to make those affiliations important 
into the future" (p. 128).30 
This is very interesting and true, but it is not clear what fol-
lows. One possible implication is that states should avoid identi-
fying groups, but is this practicable? Probably not; it is difficult 
to understand how a group-respecting, pluralism-encouraging 
polity could avoid identifying the groups whose autonomy it 
wished to respect unless it had a flat policy of recognizing all 
self-identified groups.31 Such an approach, however, would cre-
ate well-known problems. Allowing significant autonomy to 
large numbers of groups could threaten the stability of the larger 
national polity (pp. 154-55) and likely would create jurisdictional 
conflicts among groups, particularly to the extent individuals be-
long to more than one group. Later in the book Weisbrod al-
ludes to a more modest solution, that the state support a large 
number of groups, far beyond the most obvious group categories 
(p. 153).32 In addition to the difficulties discussed above of de-
stabilizing the national polity and multiplying jurisdictional con-
flicts, however, expanding the groups supported by the state still 
runs the risk of "freezing" those supported affiliations. Perhaps 
Weisbrod is of the view that this approach nonetheless is a rea-
sonable middle position to adopt. 
Another complexity Weisbrod explores in the book's final 
chapters is the various relationships between individuals and 
groups. Without citing to any particular political theorists, Weis-
brod criticizes contemporary liberal political thought for having 
"very little to say about groups generally" such that even 
" [ w ]here it does consider groups, it does so within the context of 
30. Weisbrod nicely illustrates the changeability of what groups count by noting 
that "(i]n the United States, diversity (viewed as desirable) is measured by ethnicity, 
gender, and race, more perhaps than by region of residence or birth or by religion, all of 
which were once prominent differentials" (pp. 136-37). 
31. One caveat is in order: Perhaps a central government with minimal powers that 
bordered on anarchy could respect sub-state groups without having to identify them on 
account of the fact that the central government would not do very much. 
32. "The Minorities Treaties, for entirely understandable reasons, focused on 
groups limited to the familiar categories created by the historical conditions under which 
they were developed. But the possible groups that might be entitled to the positive sup-
port of the state are highly various" (p. 153). 
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individualism, so that the group is a product, for example, of the 
exercise of an individual's rights to association of free exercise" 
(p. 158). While this reader shares Weisbrod's view that any such 
systematic oversight would be problematic, it is not clear what 
the author believes to be the practical costs of such neglect. One 
might think a casualty is the absence of group rights, but Weis-
brod elsewhere rejects the view that "legal recognition of a 
group right is necessary for group life" because "[g]roup rights 
can usually be easily understood in terms of individual rights" (p. 
129).33 In fact, Weisbrod's analysis at more than one point seems 
to question whether the distinction between individual and 
group can be sustained: 
We often argue, following liberal political theory, that groups 
result from the choices of individuals .... We also feel, how-
ever, that the groups were there first, and that the roles we as-
sume are somehow there first. Sometimes we feel that they 
are natural or innate. We can perhaps say both at the same 
time: individuals create groups and groups create individuals 
(p. 202). 
The complexity of it all leads to near vertigo in the book's 
last chapter, where it is argued that "we are even plural in our-
selves" (p. 202). People belong to multiple groups, each of which 
has its own set of norms, and these codes of conflict sometimes 
conflict (p. 202). Moreover, people change over time, such that 
" [ w ]e are sometimes as different from ourselves as from other 
people" (p. 200). According to Weisbrod, this more "compli-
cate[ d]" understanding of the individual as not being a "unit-
self" renders the individual's relations to groups, and groups' re-
lationships to the state, even more profoundly complex (p. 206). 
But while it is true that people are not stagnant and that 
they simultaneously belong to multiple groups, most people 
probably experience a greater continuity of self than the book's 
last chapters suggest. Change frequently is incremental, and it 
often is the case that one group with which an individual identi-
fies provides the primary normative framework into which 
commitments associated with the other groups are fitted, 
thereby bringing into harmony the competing values to which 
she is committed.34 For these reasons, there may be only modest 
33. See alsop. 206 (considering that "one's interest in group life and in the diversity 
of group life and even its sovereignty has its roots in individual autonomy"). 
34. For an illuminating account that likens the process of commensurating values that 
are technically incommensurable to the definition of the self, see Elijah Millgram, Incom-
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public policy implications of the various complications regarding 
individual and group identity that Emblems surveys in its last 
chapters. It may be best that law addresses individuals and 
groups at all points in time despite the fact that the identities of 
individuals and groups might be inconstant over the medium- or 
long-term. The book's reminder that individuals and groups are 
dynamic, nonetheless, is extremely important.35 
II 
The wide range of materials Weisbrod collects enables the 
book to unquestionably succeed in its stated goal of displaying 
pluralism's complexity and seeming intractability. The book's 
conclusion that "there is no single sense of the state over time 
and in all countries, and that possibilities for individuals in rela-
tion to the state will be highly various" is important (p. 206). 
However, judges and politicians do not have the luxury of giddy 
intellectual excitement when confronted by concrete claims as-
serted by groups seeking autonomy or by individuals who have 
been aggrieved by groups. That such conflicts appear irresoluble 
under the book's atheoretical approach itself constitutes a rec-
ommendation for a sustained theoretical effort. 
Though Emblems eschews any effort to formulate a defini-
tive analytical framework, its eclectic materials provide sugges-
tive glimpses into what the general contours of such a framework 
might look like. As a threshold matter, although there are bene-
fits to Emblems' effort to examine the issues of group life gen-
erically, it is important to keep in mind that different groups 
raise very different issues. Four types of groups are discussed at 
various points in the book: (1) conquered aboriginal cultures 
such as Native Americans in the United States, (2) religious 
groups, (3) ethnic groups, and (4) newly formed "identity" 
groups based on shared characteristics such as physical disability 
or sexual orientation. Clearly, the normative justifications for re-
specting group autonomy are not identical across all these 
groups. For example, with regard to Native Americans, respect-
ing group autonomy fulfills treaty obligations and redresses his-
torical wrongs. These same justifications do not apply to the 
other three groups. Similarly, the risks of respecting group 
mensurability and Practical Reasoning, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, 
AND PRACTICAL REASON 151-69 (Ruth Changed., 1997). 
35. For an important recent discussion of these ideas, see SEYLA BENHABIB, THE 
CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA (2002). 
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autonomy vary from group to group. For example, the risk of 
fragmenting the nation is less in respect of Native Americans 
than religious groups because (among other reasons) Native 
Americans are a small and discrete subset of the larger popula-
tion. Consequently, for some purposes it might be beneficial to 
analyze by referring to specific groups rather than "groups" gen-
erically. 
Among the most suggestive of the materials Emblems dis-
cusses is John Calhoun's concept of "concurrent majority" (p. 
32). While contemporary philosophical defenses of pluralism 
have relied primarily on the principle of equal protection/6 the 
concept of concurrent majority suggests another promising ap-
proach: foundational democratic theory. Calhoun's idea was that 
the majority vote of sub-federal polities could override federal 
policies adverse to the interests of the sub-federal polity (p. 32). 
One need not support the particulars of Calhoun's proposal, nor 
the horrific institution of slavery that it was invoked to defend, 
to appreciate that the concept of concurrent majority raises a 
profound question that goes to the heart of democratic theory: 
Even if one grants the proposition that it is fair that numerical 
majorities can politically coerce numerical minorities-a propo-
sition that is not at all self-evidene7 - how is it to be determined 
what group constitutes the appropriate "we" of which there need 
be a majority to enact law? That is, who belongs to group "A," 
with respect to which the majority of group "A" can politically 
coerce the minority, and who belongs to group "B," over which a 
majority of group "A" has no political say? 
The underlying issues are these: What is the appropriate 
size of the democratic polity, and what are the criteria for mem-
bership in the political community?38 While many democratic 
theorists have asked the first question-including Plato, Rous-
seau, and Montesquieu39 - they were concerned not with ac-
commodating diverse populations, but with securing the condi-
36. See Taylor, supra note 11; KYMLICKA, supra note 11. For a concise summary, 
see Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
37. For a good discussion of the problem of majority rule, see Christopher J. Peters, 
Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 1-7 
(2001). 
38. Weisbrod spends a paragraph on the idea that "underneath many of the histori-
cal discussions of federalism and republicanism was a question about the correct size of 
the political unit" (p. 41), though she does not connect that discussion to Calhoun. 
39. See ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFfE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 5-7 
(1973). 
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tions necessary for the successful operation of democratic poli-
tics.40 Both the appropriate size of polities and how membership 
in the political community is determined assume particular ur-
gency, however, where the population is heterogeneous. If poli-
ties are too large- imagine, for instance, that there were only a 
national government and no sub-federal polities-the desires of 
numerical minorities will be systematically submerged to the 
wants of majorities.41 On the other hand, the existence of a 
deeply heterogeneous citizenry also might cut against the crea-
tion of multiple small polities insofar as granting group auton-
omy under such conditions might risk fragmenting the larger po-
litical community. 
Insistence on large polities that systematically drown out the 
desires of numerical minorities, however, may lead to political 
instabilities in the medium to long term. Moreover, such insis-
tence is normatively suspect. What, after all, makes majority rule 
legitimate but minority rule tyrannical? Both the political losers 
in democracy, who are unable to garner the support of a major-
ity, and the political losers in despotic governments, who typi-
cally constitute the numerical majority, are subjected to laws 
they do not wish to be ruled by and in this sense are governed 
against their will. One response some of our best democratic 
theorists have offered to this beguilingly difficult question of 
what justifies majority rule is that legitimate democratic institu-
tions permit people to understand themselves as the authors of 
40. Under classical Greek political thought, for example: 
A democratic polity must have so few citizens that all of them could meet fre-
quently in the popular assembly to listen, to vote, perhaps even to speak. Small-
ness, it was thought, enhanced the opportunities for participation in and control 
of the government in many ways. For example, in a small polity every citizen 
stood a very good chance of being chosen by lot at least once in his lifetime to 
sit on one of the important administrative bodies. Smallness made it possible for 
every citizen to know every other, to estimate his qualities, to understand his 
problems, to develop friendly feelings toward him, to analyze and discuss with 
comprehension the problems facing the polity. 
ld. at 5. 
41. To illustrate, there were no more than a few thousand members of the Rajneesh 
religious group in the 1980s, and it is virtually inconceivable that many of their idiosyn-
cratic political desires ever would have been shared by a majority of American citizens. 
By creating the municipality of Rajneeshpuram, where all citizens were adherents of the 
Rajneesh creed, the Rajneesh created a "we" that guaranteed that their particular zoning 
and other needs could become law in some polity. See Outer Limits, supra note 11, at 
1082-86 (discussing Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Or. 1984)). 
To be sure, the complexity of political dynamics complicates the effort to assess the 
appropriate size of democratic polities. Smaller polities are not always the place where 
numerical minorities find political protection. And, as shown by the antidiscrimination 
laws in this country, sometimes numerical minorities are most successful at the national 
level. 
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the laws that bind them.42 Additionally, today's minority might 
be in the majority next time. These justifications are unavailing, 
however, to the extent there exists discrete subgroups in society 
that have interests that systematically diverge from the larger so-
ciety's desires. Subjecting such groups to the will of the numeri-
cal majority may be more akin to despotism than to democracy's 
promise of self-rule, insofar as it is unlikely that such groups' 
preferences will be reflected in law unless such groups' prefer-
ences undergo significant change. Insisting on a large polity that 
implies the existence of a single political self, when in fact there 
are multiple groups and hence multiple selves, thus may corrupt 
democracy. Diverse populations might require "selves-rule"-
democratic pluralism-rather than the pretense of "self-rule" in 
the form of a single large polity. 
Critically, our country's federalist structure allows for the 
possibility of "selves-rule" pluralism, for federalism contem-
plates the existence of multiple governments comprising varying 
numbers of citizens. Because some of these polities may be very 
small-such as cities and villages-a group of persons that is 
only a fraction of the national population can constitute them-
selves as a governmental unit in which their preferences can be 
translated into law. Whether federalism's potential of selves-rule 
pluralism can be realized depends on several factors, including 
the powers possessed by the sub-federal polities and the extent 
that the geographical lines that divide meaningful groups coin-
cide with state or city borders. Whether this possibility of selves-
rule pluralism should be realized turns on contestable normative 
questions,43 most notably: Is our country's core political culture 
characterized by common substantive commitments harmonized 
in a particular fashion, or by a shared commitment to allowing 
different people to order their lives as they deem to be appropri-
ate? 
This question goes to the heart of our national political 
identity, and it surely is not easy to answer. But the multiple po-
litical selves that federalism is capable of accommodating would 
seem to make avoidance of such deep theoretical questions im-
possible. While Weisbrod seems to be of the view that determin-
ing the appropriate bounds and extent of pluralism is not ame-
nable to a principled resolution, Emblems does not provide an 
42. It has been argued that this is true of Haberman, Raz, and Michelman. See Pe-
ters, supra note 37, at 3-7. 
43. It also turns on the empirical question of the extent to which the activities of 
other groups impose spillover effects on outsiders. 
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argument as to why this is so. Indeed, if anything, the book's 
finely detailed portrayal of pluralism's seeming intractability 
only showcases the necessity of continuing the search for ade-
quate theory. Perhaps the development of a theory of what de-
mocracy requires under conditions of deep heterogeneity-
which would have to address the appropriate size of democratic 
polities, the extent of sub-federal polities' "selves-rule," and the 
nature of the overarching national political identity that could be 
expected- is the essential next step in the search for the peace-
able kingdom. 
